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The current paper uses a series of metrics of customs and administrative procedures 
produced by the World Bank to estimate gravity models.  The metrics include estimates 
of the number of days at the border, the number signatures and the number of documents 
necessary for a product to cross the border of the importer and the exporter.  Simulations 
using the estimated elasticities show that to improve trade reductions would need to be 
made in the different metrics.  For the greatest benefits all trading partners would have to 
make the improvements.  Additionally, some products are more sensitive to the metrics 
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What a Difference a Day Makes: 
An Estimate of Potential Gains from Trade Facilitation 
  Beginning at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996 the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) took on trade facilitation as a negotiating topic.  A WTO-
acceptable definition reflects “a multitude of issues that are relevant to the smooth and 
efficient flow of trade.  The term has been used in the context of a broad range of 
potential non-tariff barriers such as import licensing, product testing and overly-complex 
customs clearance procedures.” (WTO 2005, p.9)  The aim of the WTO negotiations on 
trade facilitation is to improve cooperation between customs and other related authorities 
on issues of trade facilitation and customs compliance issues (WTO, 2007).   
  A body of literature exists to suggest the importance of trade facilitation (or 
customs and administrative) issues.  In terms of trade restrictions affecting developing 
countries Fliess and Lejarraga (2005) identified customs and administrative procedures as 
one of the most problematic non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that developing countries contend.  
The cumbersomeness of customs and administrative procedures has been a challenge for 
developing countries in exporting to developed countries but also to other developing 
countries.  Developed countries also find customs and administrative producers 
cumbersome (OECD, 2005) Understanding better the trade effects of customs and 
administrative procedures is important global trade.  The current research provides 
quantitative evidence that excessive customs and administrative procedures are inhibitors 
to trade.   
  One way to consider the effect of customs and administrative procedures is to 
say that they “thicken” the borders of countries.  Customs and administrative procedures 
are necessary, but requirements beyond what is necessary to move a product through the   2
border in a manner consistent with local policy objectives may unnecessarily hinder trade 
by “thickening” the border.  The metrics discussed below measure the thickness of 
borders.  If this thickness matters to trade, then reducing this thickness will increase trade 
flows.  Since products traded must cross at least two borders, the thickness of the border 
is a function of the policies of trading partners.  Therefore consideration must be given to 
the custom and administrative produces of the exporter and the importer. 
  In the following analysis, we present metrics, produced by the World Bank, of 
customs and administrative procedures.  We compare regions of the world based on these 
metrics and show that developing countries have relatively thicker borders than 
developing countries.  Then we use these metrics in statistical models.  From the results 
of the models, we run simulations to indicate the extent of reform in customs and 
administrative procedures to increase trade flows (Wilson (2007) is an earlier version of 
this paper in working paper form). 
Effects of Customs and Administrative Procedures on Trade 
  The current research is based on metrics derived from the World Bank survey 
called “Doing Business: Benchmarking Business Regulations.”  In the 2005 survey, a 
new section was added called “Trading across Borders,” which looks at “procedural 
requirements for exporting and importing a standardized cargo of goods.” (World Bank, 
2005)  The goods considered are coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and manufactures thereof; 
textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles; and articles of apparel and clothing accessories  
The survey contacted local freight forwarders, shipping lines, customs brokers and port 
officials on the necessary documents, signatures and time to cross the border.  
  For both exports and imports, three types of metrics are available from the   3
World Bank survey:  The documentation measure (Number of Documents) is the number 
of documents needed to cross the border.  The documents considered include port filing 
documents, customs declaration and clearance documents and official documents 
exchanged between the concerned parties.  The signature metric (Number of Signatures) 
represents the total number of signatures, stamps or other approvals necessary to satisfy 
one or more formal procedures. The time metric (Days at the Border) is the number of 
calendar days needed for a product to cross the border.    
    The survey generates a metric for the burdensomeness of customs and 
administrative procedure for the 156 countries that responded to the survey.  Table 1 
below provides summary statistics for the regions of the world.  The ranking of the 
metrics for imports and exports is similar across metrics.  OECD countries have the least 
number of restrictions in terms of number of documents, number of signatures and days 
at the border, while Sub-Saharan Africa has the most.  This result indicates that trade 
with and amongst countries in Sub-Saharan Africa pass through the thickest borders.  
  The differences between Sub-Saharan Africa and OECD countries are large.  
Consider the coefficients of variation (CV) for the different metrics.  The greatest 
dispersion is in the number of signatures.  The least disperse is the number of documents.  
An implication of the large CVs for Number of SignaturesExport and Number of 
SignaturesImport are that there is greater space, relative to that of the other metrics, for 
improvements. 
  These metrics are highly correlated with one another.  Consider the correlation 
coefficients for the Number of SignaturesExport and Number of SignaturesImport (0.94) and 
Days at the BorderExport and Days at the BorderImport the number of days for the exporter   4
and importer (0.95).  These results suggest that countries tend to treat imports and exports 
in a similar manner.  An interesting result is that the number of signatures and days at 
border are highly correlated with the lowest coefficient of 0.78 for Number of 
SignaturesImport and Days at the BorderExport.  The correlation suggests that the days or the 
signatures tend to be similar.  The Number of DocumentsExport and Number of 
DocumentsImport (0.68) are not as highly correlated with each other and the other metrics 
as are the other metrics.  Overall, the large coefficients of correlation suggest that 
countries with thick borders typically have large values for all the metrics for both 
exports and imports. 
  We now use these metrics in a gravity model to estimate the effect of the 
corresponding customs and administrative procedures on trade.   This method is 
influenced by the work of Hausman et al. (2005).  The gravity model is a common model 
for trade analysis, and a number of studies show the usefulness of the gravity model 
(Ferrantino, 2005; Nicoletti, et al., 2003; and Wilson and Cacho, 2007; among others).  
This analysis is particularly relevant for understanding the effects of NTBs on trade in 
goods.  We use an approach similar to that used for the analysis of logistics services (see 
Nordås, Pinali and Geloso Grosso (2006)).   
The Preliminary Model 
  In the preliminary models, we use the basic gravity model.  The gravity model is 
broadly based on Newton’s equation for gravity.  The economic analogue is that the 
economic mass of the two countries, as measured by GDP, is hypothesized to have a 
positive influence on the bilateral trade between the countries.  The distance between the 
countries, which represents travel costs, is hypothesized to have a negative effect on   5
trade.  From there, economists have added a number of other policy variables to explain 
further trade flows.  In the preliminary model we have included indicator variables: 
Common Language; Shared Colonial Link, which indicates a shared colonizer; Colonial 
History, which indicates a colonizer and former colony; Shared Border; and regional 
trade agreement indicator variables.  Our concern is the effect of different measures of 
customs and administrative procedures on trade flows, so we incorporate the variables: 
Days at the BorderImporter, Number of SignaturesImporter and Number of DocumentsImporter.  
Because of the high correlation amongst these variables, we estimate separate equations 
for each of these variables.  It should be noted that these variables are not bilateral that is 
we do not have the number of days for an importer to receive products from a particular 
exporter.  The variables representing customs and administrative producers are averages 
over all exporters and importers.  They serve, at best, as estimates of the actual values.   
  The dependant variable used in these equations and the ones that follow are 
bilateral trade of coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and manufactures thereof (SITC 07); textile 
yarn, fabrics, made-up articles (SITC 65); and articles of apparel and clothing accessories 
(SITC 84).  We chose these products because the metrics of customs and administrative 
procedures were based on these products. The survey was conducted in 2004 so we only 
use data for that trade year.  Even though we only have one year of data, the data are still 
in panels because of the different exporters, importers and products.  Therefore, we use 
estimation techniques to manage panels.  Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) 
Kowalski and Shepard (2006) and Lesher and Mirodot (2006) we use a fixed effects 
model.  In this model we have indicator variables for exporters, importers and products.  
We suppress the presentation of these variables in the Table 2.   6
  In this preliminary analysis we use only the metrics for imports.  That is, we 
investigate how exports are affected by the customs and administrative procedures of 
importers.  We hypothesize that the metrics should have a negative effect on exports.  
The gravity model variables are hypothesized to follow the typical pattern: The variables 
for GDP, language and colonial ties should be positive.  Some if not all of the indicator 
variables for regional (or preferential) trade agreements RTAs (or PTAs) should be 
positive.  The distance variable and the dummy variables for landlocked exporter and 
importer should be negative. 
  The results of these preliminary regressions indicate that two of the three 
variables representing customs and administrative procedures are the right sign and 
statistically significant (Days at the BorderImporter and Number of SignaturesImporter).  The 
Number of DocumentsImporter  is statistically significant but positive, which is not the 
correct sign.  In a random effects model, Number of DocumentsImporter was the right 
negative and statistically.    We posit that the analysis with only one side of the metric is 
biasing the result such that it is positive.  In subsequent estimates we show that by 
considering the metrics for both partners and an adjustment to the distance, the upward 
bias is eliminated. 
Trade Effects of Time-Adjusted Distance 
  In the traditional gravity model, the distance between countries, typically 
measured as the distance between the capitols or major cities, is used as a proxy for travel 
costs.  As the distance between countries increases, one would expect that the travel costs 
would increase similarly.  However, a reasonable assumption would be that the same 
distance between two developed countries and two developing counties would not have   7
the same travel costs.  Consider the bilateral trade partners presented in Table 5.  The 
distance between Portugal and Finland, which ranks second by shortest distance, is 
similar to the distance between, Russia and Afghanistan which ranks third by shortest 
distance.  However, the difference between these trading partners in the time necessary 
for a product to leave the exporting country and enter into the importing country is 
substantial, a difference of 101 days (over three months).  For time-sensitive products 
like apparel and clothing accessories, long delays at the border may exclude the product 
from market (Nordås, Pinali and Gelso Grosso, 2006).  Also if there is a cost of storage or 
refrigeration, these extra days could substantially raise the costs.  Therefore, we have 
incorporated the time metric into the distance metric to construct a new metric of 
distance, Distance Weighted, which is described in the following section.  With this new 
metric we see a different ranking of distances.  With the new distance, the trading 
partners Portugal and Finland are now the closest partners of those in Table 3, while 
Russia and Afghanistan are now the eight most far apart in Table 3. 
  The metric of time-weighted distance needs to be used with caution.  The 
adjusted distance is limited to the three products categories and the year for which the 
time metrics are derived.  The time at the border may vary even within the products 
considered and destination.  The metrics for time may actually overestimate the time 
because there could be time savings for trades of larger sizes or frequently traded 
products.  For these reasons, the new, adjusted distance metric does not obviate the use of 
the simple distance; however, for this application, the adjusted distance may help us 
develop better estimates of the cost of customs and other administrative procedures.   8
Distance Adjusted for Time 
  We construct a new variable for the distance because we feel that time at the 
border may have a substantial affect on the travel cost of products and can substantially 
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The distance is “the geodesic distances following the great circle formula, which uses 
latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities/agglomerations, in terms of 
population” (Gaulier, Mayer and Zignago, 2004, p. 3). Additionally, we adjusted the 
distance by the remoteness, which Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) argue helps reduce 




















  In the three estimations in Table 4, we include a different measure of the 
customs and administrative procedure variables.  We use the natural logarithm of product 
of the variables for the importer and the exporter.  For Number of SignaturesExporter* 
Number of SignaturesImporter and Number of DocumentExporter* Number of 
DocumentssImporter, the elasticity is simply the coefficient from the regression.  The 
elasticities are the same for the exporter and the importer.  Because of the interaction 
between the variables for the distance and days at the border, the elasticity  i   Border,   at   Days ε  
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  The metric of time-weighted distance needs to be used with caution.  The 
adjusted distance is limited to the three products categories and the year for which the 
time metrics were derived.  The time at the border may vary even within the products 
considered and destination.     
  With this adjusted distance variable, we estimate similar equations as in the 
preliminary models.  The changes are that we include the new time-adjusted distance.  
For each metric, we use the product of the metric for the importer and exporter, where 
previously, we only used the metric for the importer.  This new version will permit us to 
see how the changes in the metric will affect exporters and importers separately.     
  The new regressions give us new elasticities for the metrics. The new estimates 
of the elasticities for the metrics are presented in Table 4.  The new elasticises are smaller 
than the old elasticities.  We assert that the new estimates are not biased as in the 
preliminary model.  The new elasticities are close to the pervious estimates, a result that 
suggests the robustness of our results.  The document variable is now negative and 
statistically significant which is as we had hypothesized. 
By Bilateral Pairs 
  As case studies, let us now consider bilateral, country pairs to understand better 
the effect of reductions in the days at the border for the exporter and importer on trade 
between partners we use the results from Table 4.  Table 5 presents the number of days at 
the border, the number of signatures and the number of documents for a product to depart   10
an exporting country and enter an importing country.  Table 6 presents aggregate trade 
across the three products for a select group of trading partners.  We consider a reduction 
in the number of days to achieve a 10% increase in trade.   
  From Table 6, we can see the necessary reduction in the number of days to 
increase trade by 10% between bilateral trade partners.  We assume that each partner 
reduces the number of days by the same percentage (see Appendix 1).  The 
disaggregation, by trade partners, highlights the significant differences amongst the 
countries in the data.  For example if Brazil had reduced the time to export by nearly four 
days and Bolivia had reduced the export time by nearly five days on average, Brazil 
could have seen a $2.717 million increase in trade to Bolivia.  If, at the same time, Peru 
had reduced the days to import products by nearly three days on average, Brazil could 
have earned an extra $4.0528 million in exports to Peru, for a total of $6.760 million.  
Table 7 considers the necessary reduction in the number of signatures to spur a 10% 
increase in trade.  Considering the same country pairs, had Brazil, Bolivia and Peru 
reduced the number of signatures or documents by one, Brazil would have exported an 
additional $6.760 million to its two trade partners.  Had both partners reduced the number 
of signatures by one, the increase in trade would have been the same. 
  Another pair of countries to consider is Portugal and Finland.  Yarn and clothing 
exports from Portugal and Finland in 2004 totaled over $64.768 million.  For Portugal to 
have exported an extra $6.477 million to Finland, Portugal would have had to cut the 
number of days to export by nearly 1.5 days and Finland 0.58 days (13.9 hours).  In terms 
of the number of signatures, Portugal and Finland would have had to cut one signature. 
  These results point to the benefits of all countries improving customs and   11
administrative procedures.  In this experiment had only Brazil decreased it time or 
signatures, it would have earned only $3.877 million, which is just over half of the 
increase in trade had all partners reduced the time to trade.   Similar results can be found 
with other country pairs. 
  These results suggest the potential benefits of reducing the thickness of borders.  
However, for a true evaluation, we would need an estimate of the costs of implementing 
policies to reduce the thickness (see OECD (2004b) for a discussion of the costs of 
reforming customs and administrative procedures).  Let us assume diminishing marginal 
returns to actions to reform customs.  We posit that the cost of reducing the number of 
days at the boarder even one day is more costly for countries with a relatively efficient 
customs office (Denmark) compared to a country with a relatively inefficient customs 
office (Uzbekistan) based on Table 5.  Because the benefits are differential for trading 
partners, leaving improvements of customs to trading partners leads strategic games.  
From these examples, the culmination of the benefits across different trading pairs 
improves global welfare.  Thus, we see the usefulness of the trade facilitation 
negotiations at the World Trade Organization. 
By Product 
  In the third specification, we consider the effect of the different measures on 
each product.  We constructed product specific variables by multiplying the product 
indicator variables with the different metrics of customs and administrative procedures.  
These new variables permit us to see how the different metrics affect each product 
differently.  As seen in Table 8, many of the product specific variables are statistically   12
significant suggesting that the products are affected differentially by the different metrics 
of customs and administrative procedures. 
  These results are assumed to hold across all three product groups in the data set.  
However, some products may be more sensitive to customs and administrative 
procedures than other products.  In the final model specification, we disaggregate the 
effect of each customs metric for each product in the data set.  All three products are 
sensitive to customs and administrative procedures because of the statistically significant 
results.  However some products are more sensitive than others. 
  A particular case can be seen by looking at the Days at the Border and its effect 
on the trade of the three product groups between Brazil and Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, 
Kenya and Nigeria, and Portugal and Finland (see Table 9). Textile yarn, fabrics and 
made-up products appear to be the least sensitive to time for both partners because of the 
relatively larger reductions in border time necessary to increase trade by 10% for this 
product group. For trade between Brazil and Peru, a reduction in the number of days by 
2.86 and 2.27 would increase trade of coffee, tea and spices by 10%, but trade in textile 
yarn, fabrics and made-up articles (which had a larger export value to Brazil), would need 
a greater reduction in days at border 4.04 and 3.21 in order to achieve a 10% increase in 
trade.  A similar result holds for Kenyan exports to Nigeria.  This disaggregation shows 
that to reap the greatest benefits, reductions should be based on those products which are 
most sensitive to NTMs. 
Conclusions 
  These results generate a series of questions:  What does it mean for a country to 
eliminate one document or one signature?  Does removing a signature reduce the amount   13
of time that a product waits at the border?  Does one fewer document hamper the ability 
customs authorities to process a product?  Would one less signature increase the risk of 
importing dangerous goods?  How much control does a government have to lower the 
days at the border if private firms are involved in some part of customs clearance?  These 
questions prompt us to interpret the results with great caution, and we must consider 
these results as indicative of the direction and relative importance of different customs 
and administrative procedures on trade.  The results do not provide evidence of the actual 
amount that will be gained from improved customs. 
  Nevertheless, we find evidence that improving the efficiency of NTMs such as 
customs and administrative procedures can facilitate trade.  The statistical models, with 
their attendant simulations, show that all countries can benefit from more efficient 
customs and administrative procedures, with the greatest benefits accruing to those 
countries that seem to have less efficient customs and administrative procedures.  To gain 
the greatest benefit from improving customs and administrative procedures, both trade 
partners need to make efforts, even if these efforts are not equivalent.  Greater reductions 
are needed from those partners with less efficient customs and administrative procedures.  
The Brazilian examples provide evidence to support these claims.  Lower income trading 
partners require greater reductions in the number of days to attain similar percentage 
increases in exports.  The greatest benefits accrue from improving those procedures 
relevant for moving products that are most sensitive to cumbersome and long customs 
and administrative procedures.  Additionally, depending on the cost of reduction, it 
would seem that reducing the number of required documents or signatures generates 
greater benefits than similar reductions in the numbers of days.  The results and questions   14
presented here suggest the need for further research, especially research that links these 
benefits to the cost of reducing the different metrics.   15
Table 1.  Regional Averages of Trading Across Borders Metrics 










Days at the 
BorderImport 
  Regional Averages 
East  Asia  &  Pacific  7.1  7.2 25.8 10.3  9.0 28.6 
Latin America & 
Caribbean  7.5  8.0 30.3 10.6 11.0 37.0 
Middle East & North 
Africa  7.3 14.5 33.6 10.6 21.3 41.9 
OECD:  High  Income  5.3 3.2  12.6 6.9 3.3  14.0 
South  Asia  8.1 12.1 33.7 12.8 24.0 46.5 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  8.5 18.9 48.1 12.8 29.9 60.5 
  World Summary Statistics 
Average  7.4 11.0 31.6 10.8 16.4 39.8 
Standard  Deviation  2.2 10.4 19.9  3.9 16.5 26.8 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.3 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.7 
 
Source: World Bank (2005)   16










ln (Days at the 
BorderImporter) 
-0.63** 
(0.19)    
ln (Number of 
SignaturesImporter)    -0.99*** 
(0.19)   
ln (Number of 
DocumentsImporter)     1.11*** 
(0.26) 
































































































Member of MERCOSUR  0.71 0.71  0.71   17
(0.51) (0.51)  (0.51) 





































2 0.58  0.58  0.58 
n 16662  16662  16662 
NB: Significance at 1% alpha level=***, at 5% alpha level=*** and at 10% alpha 
level=*.  The standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated coefficient.   18








Rank by Distance 
Adjusted for Days at 
the Border and 
Remoteness
c 
Number of Days at 
the BorderExpor t
  
Number of Days at 
the BorderImport 
Brazil Bolivia  2,381  1  2  39  49 
Brazil Peru  3,455  4  3  39  31 
Bulgaria Uzbekistan  3,756  6  9  26  139 
Canada Kyrgyzstan  10,058  9  4  12  127 
Greece Ethiopia  3,560  5  7  29  57 
Kenya Nigeria  3,806  7  6  45  53 
Portugal Finland  3,363  2  1  18  7 
Russia Afghanistan  3,368  3  8  29  97 
Singapore Denmark  9,978  8  5  6  5 
aThe distance variable comes from CEPII (see Gaulier, Mayer and S. Zignago, (2004)).   
bThe distances are ranked from the shortest to the longest distance. 
cThe adjusted distance is the distance multiplied by the natural log of the product of the numbers of days to export and import divided 
by the measure of remoteness.  Remoteness is the inverse of the sum of the distance between the exporter and all its importing partners 
divided by the GDP of the importer. 
 
Source: Doing Business (2005)   19
Table 4. Models of Customs Administration on Trade Flows (with distance adjusted by 









ln (Days at the BorderExporter*Days 
at the BorderImporter) 
-0.41** 
(0.19)    
ln(Number of SignaturesExporter* 
Number of SignaturesImporter)    -0.88*** 
(0.19)   
ln (Number of DocumentExporter* 
Number of DocumentssImporter)     -0.96** 
(0.38) 





















































2 0.58  0.58  0.58 
n 16424  16424  16424 
NB: Significance at 1% alpha level=***, at 5% alpha level=*** and at 10% alpha 
level=*.  The standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated coefficient.   20
Table 5.  Days at the Border and Number of Signatures for Trade 
 
Exporter Importer 












   for the exporter
a  for the importer
a 
Brazil  Bolivia 39  7  8 49  9  16 
Brazil  Peru  39  7  6  31 13 13 
Bulgaria  Uzbekistan  26  7  5  139 18 32 
Canada  Kyrgyzstan  12  6  2  127 18 27 
Greece  Ethiopia  29  7  6  57 13 45 
Kenya Nigeria  45  8  14  53  3  71 
Portugal Finland  18  6  4  7  13  1 
Russia  Afghanistan  29  8  8  97 10 57 
Singapore  Denmark 6 5 2  5 3 1 
aEach represents averages across all countries.  These metrics do not represent the bilateral relationships.   
 
Source: Doing Business (2005) 
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Elasticity for Days at 
the Border 
Reduction in Days at 
the BorderExporter 
Reduction in Days at the 
BorderImporter 
Brazil  Bolivia    27,166.64   -0.59  3.83  4.81 
Brazil  Peru    40,527.61   -0.60  3.75  2.98 
Bulgaria  Uzbekistan            0.70   -0.57  2.62  14.01 
Canada  Kyrgyzstan            4.98   -0.59  1.17  12.36 
Greece  Ethiopia      1,044.75   -0.59  2.83  5.57 
Kenya  Nigeria          33.68   -0.59  4.46  5.26 
Portugal  Finland    64,768.45   -0.69  1.50  0.58 
Russia  Afghanistan      1,462.39   -0.58  2.89  9.68 
Singapore  Denmark    51,910.47   -0.81  0.42  0.35 
aTotal exports include trade of coffee, tea, spices, etc.; textile yarn and fabrics, and apparel and accessories for 2004.  Some country 
pairs do not trade all three products. 
 
Source: Author's Calculations   22

























Brazil  Bolivia -0.88 1  1 -0.96 1  1 
Brazil  Peru  -0.88 1  1 -0.96 1  1 
Bulgaria  Uzbekistan  -0.88 1  2 -0.96 1  1 
Canada  Kyrgyzstan  -0.88 1  2 -0.96 1  1 
Greece  Ethiopia  -0.88 1  3 -0.96 1  1 
Kenya  Nigeria -0.88 1  5 -0.96 1  1 
Portugal  Finland -0.88 1  1 -0.96 1  1 
Russia  Afghanistan  -0.88 1  4 -0.96 1  1 
Singapore  Denmark  -0.88 1  1 -0.96 1  1 
aThe value was rounded up to one if the value was greater than zero. 
 
Source: Author's Calculations   23









ln (Days at the Border for Coffee, 














ln (Number of Signatures for 
Coffee, Tea and Spices) 
  -1.034*** 
(0.20) 
 
ln (Number of Signatures for Yarn 
and Fabric) 
  -0.74*** 
(0.19) 
 
ln (Number of Signatures for 
Clothing and Accessories) 
  -0.94*** 
(0.19) 
 
ln (Number of Documents for 
Coffee, Tea and Spices) 
   -1.14*** 
(0.38) 
ln (Number of Documents for Yarn 
and Fabric) 
   -0.83** 
(0.38) 
ln (Number of Documents for 
Clothing and Accessories) 
   -1.013***
(0.38) 























(0.12)   24

























2  0.58 0.58 0.58 
N  16424 16424 16424 
NB: Significance at 1% alpha level=***, at 5% alpha level=*** and at 10% alpha 
level=*.  The standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. Distance 
weighted by time variables and product specific effects 
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Days at the 
Border 
Reduction in 
Days at the 
BorderExporter 
Reduction in 
Days at the 
BorderImporter 
  Coffee, Tea and Spices 
Brazil Bolivia  4599.85  -0.70  2.90  3.65 
Brazil Peru  735.28    -0.71  2.86  2.27 
Kenya Nigeria  1901.66  -0.69  3.38  3.98 
   Textile Yarn, Fabrics and Made-up Articles 
Brazil Bolivia  22675.71  -0.50  4.14  5.20 
Brazil Peru  38956.38  -0.51  4.04  3.21 
Kenya Nigeria  27.99  -0.49  4.83  5.69 
Portugal Finland  30491.19  -0.60  1.58  0.61 
  Clothing and Accessories 
Brazil Bolivia  4490.93  -0.62  3.30  4.14 
Brazil Peru  835.95  -0.63  3.24  2.57 
Kenya Nigeria  4490.93  -0.61  3.84  4.52 
Portugal Finland  34277.26  -0.72  1.44  0.56 
 
Source: Author's Calculations   26
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 Appendix 
  We use the estimated elasticity to calculate the necessary reduction in the number of 
days to achieve a 10% increase in trade.  The percentage change in the number of days ( ) T ˆ   to 
achieve the 10% increase in trade is 
Exports   Border,   at   Days
T
ε
1 . 0 −
= .  The Days at Border is the product 
of Days at the BorderExporter and Days at the BorderImporter.  To attain the necessary reduction in 
the product of the days at the border, we assume that both factors are reduced by z, so that 
() ( ) z Border   at   Days z Border   at   Days Border   at   Days Importer Exporter * * * = . 
If z equals one, then no reduction occurs.  If z is between zero and one, then some or absolute 
reduction in the number of Days at the Border will occur.  To obtain the appropriate factor z, we 
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